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There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
1. Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Reasons
Empiricism may be defined as the view there is no a priori justification for any
synthetic claim. Critics object that empiricism cannot account for all the kinds
of knowledge we seem to possess, such as moral knowledge, metaphysical
knowledge, mathematical knowledge, and modal knowledge.1 In some cases,
empiricists try to account for these types of knowledge; in other cases, they
shrug off the objections, happily concluding, for example, that there is no moral
knowledge, or that there is no metaphysical knowledge.2
But empiricism cannot shrug off just any type of knowledge; to be
minimally plausible, empiricism must, for example, at least be able to account
for paradigm instances of empirical knowledge, including especially scientific
knowledge.
Empirical knowledge can be divided into three categories: (a) knowledge by
direct observation; (b) knowledge that is deductively inferred from observations;
and (c) knowledge that is non-deductively inferred from observations, including
knowledge arrived at by induction and inference to the best explanation.
Category (c) includes all scientific knowledge. This category is of particular
import to empiricists, many of whom take scientific knowledge as a sort of
paradigm for knowledge in general; indeed, this forms a central source of
motivation for empiricism.3 Thus, if there is any kind of knowledge that
empiricists need to be able to account for, it is knowledge of type (c).
I use the term “empirical reasoning” to refer to the reasoning involved in
acquiring this type of knowledge – that is, to any instance of reasoning in which
(i) the premises are justified directly by observation, (ii) the reasoning is non-
deductive, and (iii) the reasoning provides adequate justification for the
conclusion. I assume that non-deductive reasoning justifies its conclusion, if at
all, by rendering the conclusion probable. I call a case of empirical reasoning
“pure” if it also satisfies the further condition (iv) that the reasoning does not
depend upon or in any other way imply the existence of any a priori justification
for any synthetic claim.
I contend that there is no pure empirical reasoning. There are cases of
reasoning satisfying (i)-(iii), but none of them also satisfy (iv). All empirical
1 BonJour 1998; Bealer 1992; Huemer 2005, ch. 5.
2 Carnap 1932; Ayer 1952, chs. 1, 6.
3 Think, for example, of the seemingly unconscious way in which Quine (1951, p. 39) conflates
“the totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs” with “total science” or “the whole of
science,” and  Schlick (1974, p. ix) conflates “the entire system of knowledge” with “all the
sciences.” Schlick (p. x) immediately goes on to claim that work in epistemology should rest on
examining natural science as a model.
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reasoning requires background cognitive attitudes that cannot be justified on the
basis of observations, logic, or the analysis of concepts. (Non-skeptical)
empiricism is thus an untenable epistemological doctrine.
2. Empiricism Has No Coherent Account of Empirical
Reasons
2.1. Empirical Reasoning Requires Background Probabilities
Any empirical inference depends for its justificatory force on background,
probabilistic information. This information is of two kinds: (i) information
reflected by the prior probability of the conclusion; (ii) information reflected in
certain conditional probabilities, or in prior probabilities of certain conjunctive
propositions (these last two being interchangeable in probability theory).4 I start
with the theoretical justification of this point, followed by illustrative examples.
The theoretical justification begins from Bayes’ Theorem:
Equation 1
Let e be some observational evidence and h be the conclusion of some empirical
reasoning (perhaps inductive or abductive) from that evidence. The reasoning
succeeds in justifying h only if h is rendered probable by e, which is true only if
P(h|e) is sufficiently high (and higher than P(h)). And that, according to
Equation 1, depends on the values of P(h), P(e|h), and P(e|~h). Some
combinations of values for those three probabilities let h be highly probable in
the light of e, whereas others do not. Therefore, the justificatory force of the
empirical reasoning from e to h depends on there being (justification for) a
suitable probability distribution.
This reasoning turns on no unduly strong assumptions. In particular, note
i. The reasoning does not depend on the assumption that epistemic
justification can be reduced to probability. It requires at most the
assumption that, for a conclusion to be justified via empirical reasoning, it
is a necessary condition that the conclusion be probable (or at least, not highly
improbable), given the premises.
ii. Nor does the argument assume that the mathematical principles of
probability tell us all we need to know about justification, or even about
probability. The argument requires only that the theorems of probability,
4 That is, modulo some set of prior probabilities for atomic propositions, if one is given a
complete set of conditional probabilities, one can compute a complete set of probabilities of
conjunctions, and vice versa. So in empirical reasoning, one may rely either on credences for
conjunctions or on conditional credences.
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especially Bayes’ Theorem, are true.
iii. Nor need we assume that, in empirical reasoning, subjects must reason
about probabilities, hold beliefs about probabilities, or be able to assign
precise numerical values to the relevant probabilities. The claim is only that
the reasoner must have available some justification (independent of the
conclusion) that would suffice to reject probability distributions on which
the conclusion of the inference is improbable in light of the evidence.
For an illustration of the dependence of empirical reasoning on prior
probabilities, compare two hypotheses that might explain my sensory
experiences:
a. The brain-in-a-vat hypothesis (BIVH): I am a brain in a vat who is being
stimulated by the scientists in such a way as to create a perfect simulation
of life in the early twenty-first century.
b. The real-world hypothesis (RWH): I am a normal person living in the early
twenty-first century.
These hypotheses do not differ in their empirical predictions.5 Nevertheless, it
is reasonable to believe RWH and reject BIVH. Indeed, if we met someone who
believed BIVH, we would consider that person irrational to the point of
insanity. But since the two theories are empirically equivalent, the reason why
one of them is rational and the other not cannot lie in differing empirical
support. It must therefore be a priori. When non-philosophers hear of BIVH,
a common reaction is that it is a “crazy” scenario. This reaction can be naturally
interpreted as communicating that one attaches to the BIV scenario a very low
initial credence.
For those who dislike flights of philosophical fancy, here is a more scientific
example. In 2011, the noted Cornell psychologist Daryl Bem published a paper
reporting statistical evidence for the existence of psychic phenomena –
specifically, a form of precognition involving backwards causation.6 The
precognition hypothesis had passed tests of statistical significance in eight out
of nine experiments. For example, in one experiment, subjects were to guess
which of two curtains would have a picture behind it, where the picture and its
location were randomly selected by a computer after the subject made their
guess. Bem found that, in the cases where an erotic image was going to be
5 One might claim that the two hypotheses differ because RWH predicts that I will observe
physical objects (where “observe” is a success term), while BIVH predicts that I won’t genuinely
observe anything. The success of this move turns on what we count as our foundational
empirical evidence, whether physical-object propositions or propositions about experiences,
internally construed. If you are tempted by this move, substitute another example of two
empirically equivalent theories, where one of the theories nevertheless strikes us as crazy – for
example, the sodium-uranium transmutation theory discussed in section 3.4 below.
6 Bem 2011.
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displayed, subjects did significantly better than chance at guessing where the
picture would appear – suggesting, according to Bem, that the attractiveness of
the picture that the subject would later see influenced the subject’s guess.
When I first heard these results, I was skeptical of the theory. More than
skeptical, in fact: I did not provisionally accept the theory pending further
investigation, nor did I withhold judgment. Rather, I thought the theory was
false, and that is what I still think. In essence, I believe that Bem’s experimental
results were due to chance, rather than to precognition. Why? Prior to this
experiment, I find the existence of backwards causation and precognition
extremely improbable; thus, it is more plausible that Bem obtained statistically
significant results by chance.7
This sort of reaction is common in response to alleged evidence for psychic
phenomena: skeptics often cite “coincidence” as a hypothesis superior to the
postulation of psychic phenomena. But we would not react in this way if some
more initially plausible hypothesis were at issue. Extraordinary claims, as we say,
require extraordinary evidence. The lesson is that the success of an empirical
argument depends on the prior probability of the conclusion.
Now to illustrate the dependence on conditional probabilities, assume that I
have observed 100 shamrocks (which I can identify independent of their color),
all of which I found to be green. I might infer that, since all the observed
shamrocks so far have been green, the next one will also be green.
But now consider a new color predicate, “grue”, where it is stipulated that
an object counts as grue just in case: it is observed before now and is green, or
it is not observed before now and is blue.8 It is true that every shamrock I have
observed hitherto has been green, but it is also true that they have all been grue.
So I might infer that the next one will be grue as well.
Formally, the two inferences are analogous. But the rational conclusion is
that the next shamrock will be green, not grue. What is the difference between
the “green” hypothesis and the “grue” hypothesis? 
In this case, the difference lies either in conditional probabilities, or in
probabilities of certain conjunctions (these being mathematically
interchangeable here): the conditional probability of unobserved shamrocks
being grue given that the observed shamrocks were grue is much lower than the
conditional probability of unobserved shamrocks being green given that the
observed shamrocks were green. Alternately, we may say: the prior probability
of both observed and unobserved shamrocks being uniform with respect to
greenness is higher than the prior probability of their being uniform with
respect to grueness. Presumably, this contrasting treatment of “grue” and
“green” hypotheses in our probability distributions reflects our tendency to
think such things as that green is a genuine, natural property in a sense in which
grue is not, that the predicate “green” cuts nature at its joints in a way that
7 For a more sophisticated version of this view, see Rouder and Morey 2011.
8 Following Goodman (1955, pp. 74-81).
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“grue” does not, and that the time at which an object is first observed does not
affect its color.
None of this probabilistic information can plausibly be construed as analytic
in any relevant sense: it is not logically inconsistent, nor is it inconsistent with
the axioms of probability theory,9 nor does it somehow conflict with the
meanings of words, to assign a higher prior probability to BIVH than to RWH,
or to assign a higher probability to objects’ being uniform with respect to
grueness than to their being uniform with respect to greenness.
2.2. The Inferential Background Is Not Empirical
So far, all of this is simply to say that an empirical inference requires some
background information that is neither analytic nor directly observational. The
empiricist could accept this, provided that this background can itself be justified
on the basis of observations. The background information is not logically entailed
by any observations. Perhaps, however, it can be derived from observations via
non-deductive reasoning.
How might this work? It is unclear what empirical evidence I could possibly
bring to bear, without begging the question, on the issue of how likely it is that
I am a brain in a vat. But at least in the precognition case, I might cite the
history of failed attempts to find psychic phenomena, the number of putative
cases that have turned out to be hoaxes, the number of failed replication
attempts, and so on. I might use this sort of inductive evidence to establish a
very low prior probability for the particular ESP hypothesis entertained by Bem.
In the case of the shamrock inferences, perhaps I rely upon earlier
experiences in which I used non-grue-like predicates to make inductive
inferences, and the inferences turned out well. Or perhaps I have past
experiences that inductively confirm that objects’ colors are generally not
affected by time of first observation.
While these suggestions may seem reasonable enough, they fail to confront
the underlying philosophical problem. By invoking further empirical inferences,
they merely take the first step in a regress that the empiricist cannot complete.
These further inferences will be subject to the same problem as the original
inference: every empirical inference depends for its cogency on a suitable initial
probability distribution. When e and h are logically independent (neither entails
or contradicts the other), it is always true that a sufficiently low prior probability
for h will leave h highly improbable in the light of e, and it is always true that
9 Hereinafter, when I speak of the axioms of probability, I mean the Kolmogorov axioms: (i) the
probability of any proposition is greater than or equal to zero, (ii) the probability of a tautology
is 1, (iii) if A and B are mutually exclusive, then the probability that at least one of them is true
equals the probability of A plus the probability of B, and (iv) the probability of A and B both
being true equals the probability of A being true times the probability of B being true given that
A is true. An assignment of probabilities is “coherent” or “probabilistically coherent” provided
that it satisfies these four axioms.
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there are coherent probability distributions on which e fails to raise the
probability of h. So we would always need an independent justification for ruling
out such probability distributions. Since we cannot have an infinite series of
empirical reasons, the problem of the priors cannot in general be solved by
empirical reasoning.
2.3. The Straight Rule and Similar Proposals Fail
Perhaps the dependence on a priori information can be avoided by adopting
something like the straight rule: given n observations of A’s, out of which m
turned out to be F, set the probability of the next observed A being F equal to
m/n.10 This rule putatively avoids the threat of a priori prior probabilities by
specifying the correct credence in the inductive conclusion purely as a function
of the observed evidence, without regard to how likely an A that is F may
initially seem to the observer.
One problem with this rule is that it is inconsistent. Suppose I have just
observed three shamrocks, s1, s2, and s3. The first and third were green, while the
second was brown. What is the probability that the next two shamrocks I
observe (s4 and s5) will both be green? There are at least two ways of answering
this based on the straight rule:
1. Two thirds of observed shamrocks so far have been green, so the
probability of s4 being green is 2/3. If s4 does turn out to be green, the
observed frequency of green shamrocks will then be up to 3/4, at which
point the probability of s5 being green will therefore be 3/4. So the
probability of both being green is (2/3)(3/4) = 1/2.
2. The frequency of observed pairs of shamrocks that are both green is 1/3:
out of the pairs {s1, s2}, {s2, s3}, and {s1, s3}, only the last pair are both green.
So the probability of the pair {s4, s5} both being green is 1/3.
Perhaps there is a way of qualifying the straight rule to render it consistent.
Or perhaps some other rule can be devised that, on its face, does not require us
to employ any information beyond the sequence of observations. But here is a
general problem with any such rule: either the results of the rule are consistent
with the results of conditionalization starting from some coherent prior
probability distributions (for short: “the rule is consistent with some priors”),
or they are not. If the rule is not consistent with any priors, then the rule is
incompatible with the axioms of probability theory and should be rejected for
that reason.
If the rule is consistent with some priors, there will nevertheless be some
other priors with which the rule is inconsistent. This must be true since, as
10 A version of this rule is defended by Reichenbach (1938, pp. 340, 348-57) on quasi-pragmatic
grounds; however, the defense fails to support the straight rule over many alternatives. For brief
but effective criticisms of the straight rule, see Carnap 1980, pp. 85-6.
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discussed above, different priors lead to different results in the light of the same
evidence. Therefore, the empiricist will still stand in need of a justification for
rejecting those priors that conflict with the empiricist’s proposed rule. Once
again, if the empiricist tries to provide empirical reasoning for that rejection, we
will be embarked on a regress. The regress can only be stopped by appeal to a
priori probabilities.11
2.4. Objections to Russell’s Argument Do Not Apply to Mine
The argument thus far is reminiscent of an old argument advanced by Bertrand
Russell and later reprised by Laurence BonJour.12 Russell argued that inductive
reasoning presupposes a principle of induction – a rule that would tell one, in effect,
what conclusions may legitimately be inductively inferred from what evidence.
The correctness of such a rule evidently could not be directly observed or
deduced from direct observations. Nor could it be based on induction, on pain
of circularity (of a sort that intuitively seems vicious). So the rule would have to
be justified a priori.
Here I want to examine how an empiricist might respond to Russell, and
then explain why that response does not apply to my own argument. An
empiricist could reply to Russell that, even if there are rules that codify cogent
induction, the subject who acquires inductive justification for a conclusion need
not first know, or have justification for believing anything about, these rules. It
suffices that the subject have dispositions to accept inferences that in fact follow
the correct rules. To think otherwise – to hold that inferential justification
requires first having justification to believe in the rules of inference – is to
wrongly treat inference rules like premises of an inference.13
To elaborate on this response to Russell, compare two related points: First,
in order to justifiedly classify some object as falling under some concept, one
need not first have justification for accepting some analysis of that concept.
Epistemologists, for example, have yet to determine the correct analysis of
“know,” yet we all make justified knowledge-ascriptions all the time. In a similar
manner, might we not be able to identify cases of cogent reasoning without
knowing the rules describing such reasoning?
Second, in order to acquire justification for believing P via method M, it is
not in general required that one first have justification for believing that M is
reliable, or a source of justification, or in some other sense a good way of
11 Thus, for example, even if Reichenbach could provide an epistemic reason for relying on the
straight rule rather than any of the other coherent rules that allow learning from experience, he
would not have vindicated an empiricist account of induction; he would rather have refuted
empiricism by producing an instance of synthetic, a priori justification.
12 Russell 1912, ch. 6; BonJour 1998, ch. 7.
13 Arguments of this kind appear in Psillos 1999, pp. 82-9; Huemer 2002, pp. 332-3; Devitt 2014.
Psillos and Devitt both argue that it is permissible to use abduction to infer that abduction is
reliable, because “rule circularity,” unlike “premise circularity,” is permissible in reasoning. On
the problem of treating inference rules as premises, see also Carroll 1895.
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acquiring beliefs. Any such general requirement would lead to an infinite
regress, since one would have to acquire justification for believing that M is
reliable using some other method, M', and one would then need justification for
believing M' to be reliable. Now, if we reject the general requirement that one
have justification for believing one’s belief-forming method to be reliable, then
there seems to be no principled reason for applying a version of the requirement
to the special case where method M consists in a certain sort of inference.14 For
example, if justified perceptual belief does not depend upon one’s having
independent justification for believing that perception is reliable, then it is
plausible to hold that justified inductive belief also does not depend on one’s
having independent justification for believing that induction is reliable (or
cogent, etc.).
My purpose here is not to assess the merits of this reply. The point I want
to make is that, whatever we might think of that reply as a reply to Russell or
BonJour, it could not be made in response to my argument. For I do not treat
rules of inference like premises, nor do I claim that inferential justification
requires prior knowledge about the rules of inference. I do not suppose that the
rationality of some instance of reasoning turns on the subject’s holding, or
having justification for holding, any attitude to any propositions about logical or
epistemological relations, or about the subject’s own reasoning. Instead, I claim that
the cogency of a piece of non-demonstrative reasoning depends upon a prior
probability distribution, where the probabilities in question are probabilities of
ordinary, non-logical, non-epistemological propositions – propositions such as
“the 100th observed shamrock will be green” or “two thirds of all shamrocks are
green.” The only relevant attitudes that the subject might need to hold, or to
have justification for holding, would be credences in those ordinary
propositions (N.B., not beliefs about credences). This is much closer to finding a
priori premises on which empirical reasoning depends than to merely finding
patterns of inference on which it depends.
2.5. Skepticism Is an Unsatisfactory Response
If the problem facing empiricism is that empirical reasoning seems to depend
upon synthetic, a priori information, an easy response to the problem is to
declare that there is no successful empirical reasoning, that non-demonstrative
inferences never in fact expand our body of justified belief beyond direct
observation. There is thus no need to embrace synthetic, a priori justification.
This is the path of inductive skepticism.15 Is this a reasonable way of preserving
empiricism?
It is not. An epistemological theory should explain paradigm instances of
14 Huemer 2002, pp. 338-9. Fumerton (1995, ch. 7) recognizes the problem but nonetheless
maintains that inferential justification requires justification for endorsing the cogency of the
inference.
15 Hume [1758] 1975; Popper 1959.
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knowledge and justified belief. Or perhaps more cautiously: a key desideratum
of an epistemological theory is that it accommodate our pretheoretical
convictions about what count as clear cases of knowledge, justified belief, good
reasons, and the like.16 Among these clear cases are many beliefs arrived at by
empirical reasoning:
@ If someone asks a chemist, “What is water composed of?”, the proper
response is, “Water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen.” The proper
response is not, “No one knows.”
@ If someone asks a biologist, “Why should we believe the theory of
evolution?”, it would be correct to reply that we have a great deal of
evidence, drawn from such things as fossil records, physical similarities
among organisms of different species, and so on. It would not be correct to
reply, “We have no reason to believe the theory of evolution.”
@ If someone asks an astronomer what cosmological theories can reasonably
be held given our current evidence, it would be appropriate for the
astronomer to mention the Big Bang Theory and brane cosmology. It would
not be appropriate to include Aristotle’s theory of the planetary spheres, or
the Native American theory that the Earth rests on the back of a giant
turtle.
These are not difficult cases; the above judgments are entirely
uncontroversial among scientists. It is in fact largely from the impressive
accumulation of scientific knowledge of just that sort in the last few centuries
that empiricism gained its popularity in the twentieth century. Whether rightly
or wrongly, it was thought that scientific knowledge progressed as a result of its
adoption of an empirical methodology and rejection of a priori intuitions, and
empiricists sought to found all knowledge on the sources used by modern
science.17 It would therefore be irrational to jettison all of modern scientific
knowledge in order to preserve the doctrine of empiricism. And it would be, if
not quite contradictory, at least worrisome to treat empiricism in the manner
traditionally reserved for a priori axioms – holding it fixed and giving up any
and all particular judgments that are found to conflict with it. The empiricist, of
all people, should stand prepared to revise his theory to accommodate the cases.
Note that there is no specially strong sense of “know”, “justified”, or
“reason” in play here. The inductive skeptic is not merely one who denies
16 This is (a more moderate version of) the view Roderick Chisholm (1982) defended under the
name “particularism.” Chisholm held that epistemologists should begin from plausible
epistemological judgments about particular cases and then seek to formulate general
epistemological principles that account for those cases. As he notes, empiricism has generally
rested on the opposite approach, “methodism,” which starts from general principles and uses
them to arrive at judgments about cases. My view is more moderate than Chisholm’s, in that I
claim only that accommodating the cases is an important desideratum for a theory.
17 See again footnote 3 above.
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absolute certainty to our scientific theories, or who denies the availability of
non-circular metajustifications for our belief-forming methods, or who rejects
some other idealized, philosophical sort of knowledge. (In this, the skeptic
differs from the externalist, whose view is discussed in section 4 below.) Nor is
there an option for the skeptic to hold that scientific theories are probably
correct, close to correct, or even probably close to empirically adequate – for
each of those claims would require empirical reasoning of just the sort the
skeptic calls into question. Inductive skepticism, by definition, holds that there
is no reason whatsoever for believing the conclusion of any empirical reasoning.
On this view, there is no reason at all for preferring Copernican astronomy over
“giant turtle” cosmology, no reason for favoring the theory of evolution over
Creationism, and so on. This view is not consistent with the fundamental
motives of empiricism, nor is it on its face a believable position.
3. Subjective Bayesianism Cannot Save Empiricism
3.1. Subjective Bayesianism and the Convergence of Opinion
Subjective Bayesians hold that any coherent distribution of initial probabilities
is rationally permissible.18 Whatever one’s initial probabilities, one is rationally
required, upon acquiring new evidence, to update one’s beliefs by
conditionalization; that is, one should set one’s new credence in a given
hypothesis equal to what one previously held as the probability of that
hypothesis given the evidence:  Pnew(h) =  Pold(h|e).19 On this view, empirical
evidence can probabilistically justify a particular conclusion, not absolutely, but
relative to a particular individual’s initial credences. These initial credences
might be described as “a priori” in one sense, since they are not based on
experience – but since there is no claim that they are in any sense objectively
correct, or any more correct than any other coherent credences, we might
consider this doctrine to be consistent with empiricism.
A leading objection to subjective Bayesianism is that the theory renders
epistemic rationality and empirical reasoning too subjective.20 On the subjective
Bayesian view, whether and how much some evidence non-deductively supports
some conclusion is relative to an observer and dependent on that observer’s
psychology, as is the question of to what degree any proposition is overall
justified. Call this “the Subjectivity Objection.”
In reply, subjective Bayesians offer the convergence theorems, which show that,
18 de Finetti [1937] 1980; Savage 1954; Jeffrey 1992. Howson and Urbach (2006, p. 301),
however, claim that the notion of rational priors is “incapable of being given any coherent or
sustainable interpretation.”
19 Jeffrey (1992, ch. 3) advocates a more general rule than conditionalization, which he calls
“probability kinematics,” but the distinction is unimportant for our present purposes. Howson
and Urbach (2006, pp. 80-85) hold that the rule of conditionalization applies only on condition
that one’s conditional probabilities are unchanged when one learns new evidence.
20 Jaynes 1968, p. 228; Gelman 2008.
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under certain conditions, individuals with disparate initial probabilities for some
hypothesis will tend to converge toward certainty in the true view as evidence
accumulates.21 For example, a pair of individuals with different initial opinions
about the proportion of green marbles in a certain urn will tend to approach
agreement (their subjective probability distributions will more closely resemble
one another) as they progressively draw marbles from the urn and
conditionalize on what they observe. More specifically, both individuals’
probability distributions will come to resemble ever more closely the
distribution that assigns probability 1 to the correct estimate of the proportion
of green marbles.
3.2. The Convergence Theorems Do Not Address the Problem of Subjectivity
Even if we grant all the assumptions of the convergence theorems, the theorems
do not touch the core of the Subjectivity Objection. To address the real
subjectivity problem, what needs to be shown is something that these theorems
do not even purport to show. Here is roughly what the theorems claim:
The Convergence Principle: Given a pair of initial subjective probability
distributions, and given a desired degree of convergence in posterior
probabilities in the light of evidence, it is possible to identify an amount of
evidence that would induce the desired degree of convergence, starting from
those initial distributions.
But that is perfectly compatible with the following:
The Divergence Principle: Given any set of evidence, and any desired degree of
divergence in posterior probabilities in the light of that evidence, it is possible
to find a pair of initial probability distributions that induce the desired
degree of divergence, after conditionalizing on the given evidence.
Both the Divergence Principle and the Convergence Principle are true, across
a wide range of relevant cases. But it is the Divergence Principle that matters;
it is what underwrites the Subjectivity Objection, properly understood.
Why is it the Divergence Principle that matters? The goal, presumably, is to
secure a kind of objectivity for what we pretheoretically regard as well-
established scientific theories and other beliefs that are well-supported by
empirical reasoning. To put it more clearly, the goal is to enable us to say, under
certain conditions, that a certain conclusion is objectively well-supported by the
evidence. Now there are two important points about this:
i) Objectivity is not secured merely by the possibility of some rational
21 Savage 1954, pp. 46-50; Gaifman and Snir 1982; Hawthorne 2011. For a survey of
convergence results, see Earman 1992, ch. 6.
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observers agreeing on something. If we wish to understand objectivity in
terms of agreement, we must require agreement by all rational observers.
ii) At any given time, an observer or community of observers has a specific,
limited body of evidence. Therefore, if we wish to say that some beliefs are
objectively well-supported, we must be able to say that they are objectively
supported by such a limited body of evidence. No actual belief is rendered
justified by features of some merely potential future evidence.
Combining points (i) and (ii), we must be able to say: there are some
conclusions and some (finite) sets of evidence such that, given that evidence, all
rational observers must agree on that conclusion. That is what objectivity would
mean. And that is precisely what the subjective Bayesian cannot say.
3.3. Why the Divergence Principle Holds
Why can’t the subjective Bayesian say that? Let h be some hypothesis and let e
be the entire body of evidence relevant to h that we have at some particular
time. Assume that P(e|~h) is nonzero (otherwise, the evidence conclusively
establishes h and the issue is trivial). Then the probability of h in the light of e
can be determined from just two pieces of information: (i) the prior probability
of h, P(h), and (ii) the likelihood ratio, P(e|h)/P(e|~h). Letting “p” stand for the
prior probability of h, and “L” stand for the likelihood ratio, we have the
following simple theorem:22
Equation 2
Figure 1 contains a graph of that equation, with six different possible values of
L.23 For each value of L, posterior probability (the probability of h in the light
of e, shown on the vertical axis), is given as a function of the prior probability
(shown on the horizontal axis). When L is greater than 1, the graph curves
toward the upper left, indicating that the final probability is greater than the
initial probability, and thus that the evidence supports the hypothesis. When L
is less than 1, the graph curves downward to the right, indicating that the
posterior probability is lower than the prior probability, and the evidence
undermines the hypothesis.
Here is the important point: for any nonzero value of L, the function in
Equation 2 maps the interval [0,1], continuously and one-to-one, onto the
interval [0,1]. For every possible value of the prior probability between 0 and 1,
22 Proof: start with Equation 1 from section 2.1 above in the text, substitute (1 - P(h)) for P(~h),
and divide both the numerator and the denominator on the right hand side by P(e|~h).
23 Courtesy of the Desmos equation grapher, <https://www.desmos.com/calculator/
yr6lojrklc>, accessed January 9, 2016.
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Figure 1
there is exactly one corresponding value of the posterior probability, and for
every possible value of the posterior probability between 0 and 1, there is
exactly one corresponding value of the prior probability. In other words: you tell
me what you want the posterior probability to be, and what you think the
likelihood ratio is, and I can tell you a prior probability that delivers exactly that
posterior probability. So: if there are no constraints on the prior, then there are no
constraints on the posterior.
The preceding argument does not apply just to some special class of cases,
or some particular model of inductive reasoning. Equation 2 is a simple, general
theorem applicable to any hypothesis and any evidence, with the sole restriction
that P(e|~h) is nonzero.
Bayesians who are otherwise good subjectivists sometimes suggest special
constraints on which hypotheses one may assign a prior probability of zero to.
For instance, perhaps one should not assign probability zero to any theory that
has been seriously advanced in the scientific community.24 These sorts of
constraints make no difference to the above point. If you like, in the graph of
Figure 1, delete just the points (x=0, y=0) and (x=1, y=1). The graph then
shows a set of one-to-one functions that map the open interval (0,1) onto the
open interval (0,1). It is then no longer possible to deliver a posterior probability
of 0 by choosing a prior of 0, but it is still possible to deliver posterior
probabilities arbitrarily close to 0. Given that every prior strictly between 0 and
1 is rationally permissible, no posterior strictly between 0 and 1 can be ruled out
24 Shimony 1970, pp. 97-103. The convergence theorems typically require all agents to initially
agree on which propositions have prior probability zero.
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for all rational agents.
3.4. Evidential Relevance Must Be Subjective Too
As Figure 1 shows, individuals with different prior probabilities for a hypothesis
will disagree on the posterior probability of that hypothesis. But they might
nevertheless agree on the direction of change of the probability. That is, they might
agree, qualitatively, on whether the evidence probabilistically confirms,
disconfirms, or is irrelevant to the hypothesis. In that case, the Bayesian might
lay claim to some objective epistemic judgments, of the form “e is evidence
for/against h,” albeit not of the form “h is justified.”
Bayesian reasoners will agree on evidential relevance in this sense, if and
only if they agree on whether the likelihood ratio is greater than, equal to, or less
than 1.25 (They needn’t agree on the precise likelihoods, nor the precise value of
the ratio.) So the question now is whether the subjective Bayesian is entitled to
assume such agreement.
Here is one route to agreement. One might think that, in the case of many
interesting scientific theories, the theory entails certain observational predictions.
In that case, as all Bayesian reasoners will agree, P(e|h) = 1, where e reports such
an observation. At the same time, the negation of the theory will fail to entail
these same observational predictions. And one might think that, given that ~h
fails to entail e, all rational observers should agree that P(e|~h) < 1. Therefore,
in these cases, all rational observers should agree that P(e|h)/P(e|~h) > 1.
There are two problems with this line of thought. First, it is unclear how the
subjectivist can assume that all rational agents will agree on whether P(e|~h) is
less than 1 or is instead equal to 1. It does not follow from the axioms of
probability that when A fails to entail B, P(B|A) must be less than 1; indeed, it
is easy to see that there must be many cases in which this fails.26 So there is no
pure probability-theory reason for rejecting the equation P(e|~h) = 1.
Second, and more importantly, interesting scientific theories virtually never
entail observational predictions.27 They merely render observational predictions
plausible, sometimes extremely plausible, given our background probability
distribution. Consider two examples:
25 This is the Directional Agreement Condition assumed by Hawthorne’s (2011) convergence
theorem.
26 Suppose there is a continuous infinity of possible worlds in which A holds. Then it can’t be
the case that each of these worlds has a nonzero probability. So take a world that has probability
zero, and let B be the proposition that the actual world is not that world. Then A does not entail
B, but the probability of B given A is 1.
27 Compare Duhem [1914] 1954, pp. 185-7; Quine 1951, pp. 39-43, but note that whereas Quine
and Duhem hold that a scientific theory conjoined with many other beliefs enables one to
deduce observational predictions, my claim is that a scientific theory renders observational
outcomes more or less probable, relative to our background credences. There is no need for any
part of our belief system, including the whole of it, to entail any observational predictions.
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i) Water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen: How do we know this? One type of
experiment involves burning hydrogen in the presence of oxygen. A certain
mass of water is produced, while an equal mass of hydrogen and oxygen is
consumed. Another experiment involves applying voltage to a sample of
water. Bubbles of hydrogen and oxygen gas are produced at the negative
and positive terminals, while the mass of water present decreases by the
same amount as the total mass of hydrogen and oxygen produced.28
Neither of these phenomena is entailed by the theory that water is
composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Even if water were composed of
hydrogen and oxygen, it still could have been that we could find no way of
separating water molecules into their constituent elements, nor of
synthesizing the component elements into water.
Nor is the experimental evidence incompatible with alternative theories
of the composition of water. The cited evidence is not incompatible, for
example, with the hypothesis that water is a compound of sodium and
uranium, since it could be that burning hydrogen causes a certain mass of
hydrogen to transmute into sodium, while a certain mass of oxygen
transmutes into uranium, and it could be that electrolysis induces a reverse
transmutation.
ii) Human beings evolved by natural selection: This is suggested by, for example, the
fossil record. But the theory of evolution does not entail that there would
be an available fossil record of human ancestors, or evolutionary ancestors
of any other species. Nor do alternative theories of human origins logically
contradict the fossil record. It could be, for example, that God created the
Earth and all its species in the year 4004 B.C., and that He planted the
fossils in the ground at that time.29
I think the alternative theories described above – the sodium-uranium theory
and the Creationist theory – are objectively unjustified. If someone held those
theories, and proposed the hypotheses suggested above to account for the
empirical evidence, I would deem that person unreasonable.
But a subjective Bayesian cannot say this. The axioms of probability do not
condemn anything about those theories. The axioms of probability only dictate
the value of P(e|h) in the special case where h entails e or h entails ~e: in the
former case, one must assign P(e|h) = 1; in the latter, P(e|h) = 0. In all other
cases, any value between 0 and 1 inclusive is possible.
These are not unusual examples. The same point could be made for many
other examples of scientific evidence: the observation of Foucault’s pendulum
as evidence for the rotation of the Earth; the matching of the shapes of the east
coast of South America and the west coast of Africa as evidence for continental
drift; the observation of the Chicxulub crater as evidence for the asteroid-impact
28 Lavoisier 1783; Nicholson 1800.
29 See the theory of Philip Gosse [1857] (2003).
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theory of the extinction of the dinosaurs; and so on. Hardly any of modern
science – perhaps none – can be described as objectively rationally supported
on a subjective Bayesian account.
3.5. Subjective Bayesianism Is a Form of Skepticism
How bad is all of this? I think the subjective Bayesian’s position is similar to that
of the skeptic; indeed, subjective Bayesianism is a form of skepticism. Consider
four paradigmatic epistemological judgments:
1. There are good reasons to think that water is composed of hydrogen and
oxygen.
2. We are justified in believing that water is composed of hydrogen and
oxygen.
3. Given current evidence, it would be irrational to think that water is
composed of sodium and uranium.
4. We know that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen.
All of those are uncontroversial in normal contexts. But on the subjective
Bayesian view, a rational person apprised of all current scientific evidence could
deny all of them. In that sense, none of them is objective. Furthermore, there
is a case to be made that, given certain tenets of subjective Bayesianism, all of
(1)-(4) must be false.
Subjective Bayesians would most likely wish to embrace (1)-(4). Perhaps
they would adopt semantic theories according to which the terms of epistemic
appraisal – “good reason,” “justified,” “irrational,” and “know” – have
application conditions that are relative to the speaker’s subjective probability
distribution: if I happen to have a credence function on which [Water is
composed of hydrogen and oxygen] is highly probable on current evidence,
then I can correctly affirm (1)-(4). At the same time, of course, someone with
a different credence function might correctly deny all of (1)-(4).
The question is how plausible such a view would be. Start with the idea of
good reasons. Intuitively, there is a distinction to be drawn between what a
person is committed to and what the person, all things considered, has good reason
to believe. If I believe P, and P entails Q, then I am committed to Q. However,
it does not follow that I have good reason for believing Q, since my initial belief
in P might be purely arbitrary. If I believe P arbitrarily and without justification,
it seems, then I do not, all things considered, have good reason to believe Q,
nor am I justified in believing Q.
Subjective Bayesianism is more plausible as a theory of rational commitment
than as a theory of justification or good reasons: if you have a certain initial
distribution of credences, then it is plausible to hold that those initial credences
commit you, on receiving new evidence, to the credences that result from
conditionalizing on that evidence. But the claim that this process results in
epistemic justification or good reasons is only plausible if the initial distribution
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of credences was somehow justified. To hold that a purely arbitrary set of
credences results in justification once we follow what that set of credences
commits us to, is comparable to holding that a purely arbitrary premise justifies
a conclusion, as long as one validly deduces the conclusion from the premise.
One might reject the latter analogy on the grounds that, in the Bayesian
case, the subject would be conditionalizing on some genuine evidence, so the
conclusion would not be reached solely on the basis of arbitrary credences. This
is true. So a better analogy would be one in which, in a traditional, non-
probabilistic setting, an epistemologist claims that if one validly deduces C from
the conjunction of A and B, and A is justified but B is completely arbitrary, then
C winds up justified.
Another reply on behalf of the subjective Bayesian: on the subjective
Bayesian view, it is not that an unjustified starting point renders a conclusion
justified. Rather, the initial credences are perfectly justified; it is just that many
other (incompatible) starting points are equally justified.
But this is an extremely implausible view of justification. What could be
conferring the justification in this case? The initial credences one starts with are
explicitly said, in subjective Bayesian doctrine, to be no better than any other
coherent set of credences. All that can be said for one’s actual distribution is
that it is not ruled out by the constraints of probability theory. For example, a
good Bayesian reasoner might start with an extremely high confidence that there
are eleven purple lions within one million miles of herself, and when asked to
justify this, she might reply that no law of probability precludes that
proposition’s having a probability of 0.999999. This really cannot be described
as an adequate source of justification.
A related problem is that, if I am a subjective Bayesian, I believe that I have
no rational reason for preferring my own prior probability distribution over any
other coherent distribution. But I also know that some of these other
distributions would lead to radically different beliefs from my current belief
system, given the same evidence. I must hold these other belief systems to be
less well calibrated to reality, though an equally rational reaction to the identical
evidence. It therefore seems that I must hold that I just got lucky by happening
to have priors calibrated with reality.30
I conclude that subjective Bayesians have no plausible way of
accommodating judgments (1), (2), or (3). Since knowledge requires justification,
the subjectivists also cannot account for (4). If this is true, then there is an
enormous range of paradigmatic epistemological judgments that the subjective
Bayesian cannot plausibly accommodate.
4. Externalism Cannot Save Empiricism
Epistemological externalists hold that factors external to a subject’s mind can
30 Related concerns are raised by Hanson and Cowen (n.d.).
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affect whether and to what degree the subject is justified in a given belief. For
example, whether a belief is justified might turn on whether it was formed by
a process that in fact (whether the subject has reason to believe this or not) tends
to produce true beliefs.31
Why think externalism might be true? One sort of argument concerns cases
in which a subject suffers some cognitive malfunction but is unable to detect the
malfunction. For example, a subject might have false memories (while having
no reason to think the memories false) of having proved that P. In such a case,
many intuitively judge that the subject lacks justification for P. Even arch-
internalist Laurence BonJour conceded this point, thus apparently allowing an
external factor – whether one’s memories are veridical – to affect one’s
justification for belief.32
Though I do not find the case for externalism persuasive, adjudicating the
internalist/externalist dispute is too large a task to undertake here.33 Here, I shall
merely argue that whether externalism is correct or not, there is no help for the
empiricist. For the only form of externalism that explains the epistemological
data that we want explained is a rationalist form of externalism.
The epistemological data consists of such facts (taken from section 3.5
above) as 
2. We are justified in believing that water is composed of hydrogen and
oxygen.
3. Given current evidence, it would be irrational to think that water is
composed of sodium and uranium.
As we have seen, to accommodate such facts, we must constrain the range of
rationally permissible prior probability distributions. How might an externalist
justify such constraints? The externalist might argue that the “justified” or
“rational” priors are simply those that reliably lead to correct conclusions in the
light of the sort of empirical evidence that we humans tend to receive.
Alternately, generalizing on the notion of reliability for outright beliefs, the
externalist might propose that a justified/rational credence distribution is one
that is well-calibrated (meaning, roughly, that the things to which one assigns a
31 Goldman 1979. More sophisticated versions of reliabilism incorporate internal constraints on
justification; however, such qualifications are not relevant to my argument in the text.
32 BonJour 1998, pp. 124-9. BonJour also introduces the requirements that, to obtain a priori
justification for a belief, one must have reflected sufficiently carefully, and one must have an
adequate understanding of the concept of necessity. Hilary Kornblith (2004) has seized the
opportunity to announce the death of internalism.
33 I believe BonJour was wrong to concede the point about memory. For an extended defense
of internalism in general, see [----]. On the role of memory in justification, see [----].
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probability of x% tend to be true about x% of the time).34 The externalist can
then hold that our actual priors, which led us to accept modern science, are
justified because they are in fact well-calibrated or because they in fact tend to
lead us to true beliefs. As far as the externalist is concerned, it doesn’t matter
why they are well-calibrated or truth-conducive, nor does it matter if subjects
lack independent reasons to believe that they are well-calibrated or truth-
conducive.
Now leave aside the question of whether that is a good epistemological
theory or not. The question is, is it an empiricist theory? Here the answer is
simply no. An empiricist theory is one that accounts for all justification for
substantive (non-analytic) propositions in terms of observation and inference
from observations. An empiricist externalist is of course possible – for example,
a reliabilist who holds that the only unconditionally reliable belief-forming
processes are observation-based. But that simply is not the theory described
above. The above-described theory holds that prior probabilities are justified in
virtue of their calibration or truth-conduciveness; the idea of deriving these
priors from observation plays no role at all in the account of their justification.
It is a theory of innate justified beliefs.
On one account, suggested by Robert Nozick, the explanation for the
reliability of our inductive reasoning is to be found in evolution: natural
selection favored those who saw inductive reasoning as cogent, because in our
evolutionary history, inductive reasoning usually led people to form correct
beliefs, which promoted their survival and reproduction.35 Adapting this view
to a probabilistic framework, we can hypothesize that natural selection favored
well-calibrated prior probability distributions. Again, this is a theory of
something like innate knowledge (or rather, innately justified and calibrated
credences), not a theory of knowledge derived from experience.
Of course, epistemological internalists would reject this as a possible account
of how our prior credences are justified, since they would say that the reliability
of our credences by itself does nothing to render them justified. But externalists
could not say that. Nor could anyone who endorses the evolutionary account
coherently deny justification to our prior credences. For the evolutionary
account itself could be justified only if the theory of evolution in general is
justified, which could be true only if the prior credences that led us to accept
that theory (in the light of our current evidence) are justified. Nozick avoided
self-defeat by embracing an externalist account of reasons, according to which
the evolutionary account of the source of our priors is simultaneously an
34 More precisely, one may define a well-calibrated probability measure as one with a low Brier
score, calculated as the mean squared difference between (a) the probability assigned to a given
proposition, and (b) the truth-value of the proposition, where a true proposition has a value of
1, and a false proposition has a value of 0 (but note that this way of measuring calibration
combines the desiderata of reliability and informativeness). See Brier 1950.
35 Nozick 1993, pp. 108-9.
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account of why those priors are justified.36 None of this gets us out of the
dependence on non-observational sources of justification.
5. Rationalism
Having rejected empiricism, skepticism, and subjectivism, we are left with a
rationalist view of probabilistic reasoning. On this view, there are nontrivial
credences, or credence ranges, that are justified a priori, and these underwrite
probabilistic inferences from observations. Different accounts, both internalist
and externalist, can be given of how these credences are justified; the
justification will count as a priori provided that it is not based on observation.
My own preferred account, which I lack space to discuss in detail here, would
appeal to necessary constraints on logical probabilities, constraints that, I claim,
can be seen intuitively to be correct.37
Any rationalist view of probabilistic reasoning is open to well-known
objections. Among the challenges is the sheer difficulty of plausibly answering,
for nearly any proposition that we care about, the question of what its a priori
probability would be.38 For example, what is the initial probability, prior to
obtaining any empirical information about the world at all, that water would be
composed of hydrogen and oxygen?
I am not about to solve these problems here. This paper concerns the
problems facing empiricism, not those facing rationalism. But I will conclude
with a few remarks about how it might be rational to embrace rationalism in the
face of such unresolved difficulties.
To begin with, it is worth noting that the rationalist does not need the
strong thesis that, for any proposition whatever, there is a unique numerical
value that is its a priori probability. The rationalist need only maintain that, for
many interesting propositions, including, say, scientific theories, there is a limited
range of initial credences one can reasonably hold.39 For example, perhaps there
is no particular number that is the unique rational a priori credence for the
proposition that the Earth rests on the back of a giant turtle. But it also is not
the case that the entire range of credences from 0 to 1 could rationally be held
– it would not, for example, be rational to believe with 99% confidence that
there is such a world turtle, prior to all relevant experience.
This view avoids the problem raised for subjective Bayesianism in section
3.3. Consider again the graph from section 3.3, but this time assume that the
36 Nozick 1981, pp. 248-61, 264-8; 1993, pp. 108, 111.
37 In [----], I defend a version of the Principle of Indifference, appealing to an explanatory
priority relation to resolve some of the problems with interpreting the Principle. On the
problems facing the Principle of Indifference, see van Fraassen 1989, p. 303; Howson and
Urbach 2006, pp. 266-72.
38 Ramsey 1931, pp. 160-7; Shimony 1970, p. 87.
39 For present purposes, “limited” means having an upper bound strictly less than 1 and lower
bound strictly greater than 0.
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Figure 2
prior probability of the hypothesis, instead of being permitted to assume any
value in [0,1], is restricted to the interval [0.1, 0.9]. For illustration, focus on the
case where L = 100. In Figure 2, I have added shaded rectangles corresponding
to the restricted range of priors and the correspondingly restricted range of
posterior probabilities. The allowed range of posterior probabilities is much
narrower than the allowed range of prior probabilities: given that the prior is
between 0.1 and 0.9, the posterior must be between 0.917 and 0.999.
This phenomenon is what the Bayesian convergence theorems are really
about: in a wide range of circumstances, given a limited range of allowable
priors, the range of allowable probabilities narrows when we conditionalize on
evidence e. This does not help the subjective Bayesian, because the subjective
Bayesian is not entitled to assume that the range of permissible priors is
anything less than the full range from 0 to 1. But it does help a modestly
objective Bayesian who holds that there are a priori constraints that limit to
some degree the range of permissible prior probabilities.
This phenomenon also explains an otherwise puzzling feature of our
probabilistic intuitions: we have more definite intuitions about the probabilities
of certain hypotheses in the light of our current evidence than we do about their a
priori probabilities. If someone asks me to estimate the a priori probability of
the theory of evolution, I have very little to say. (I’m pretty sure it is not more
than 90%. But I am not sure whether it is more than 1%.) But if someone asks
me to estimate the current probability, based on everything we know, of the
theory of evolution, I have a much better idea of the answer. (I am quite
confident that one should say something strictly between 90% and 100%.)
The empiricist explanation: probability judgments depend upon empirical
evidence for their justification. The questions about a priori probability are
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harder to answer because there is no justification for any answer.
My explanation: rational probabilities become more determinate (that is, span
a narrower range), the more relevant evidence we have. Typically, a wide range
of subjective probabilities is rationally permissible to start with, but the range
narrows as we gather more evidence. With a sufficient amount of evidence, the
range of permissible credences approximates to a single value. As the range
narrows, so our confidence that we can make a reasonable estimate increases.
All of this is by way of saying that the rationalist’s commitments are
considerably weaker than might at first glance appear. This does not resolve the
difficulties raised for rationalism above, since I have not described how one may
determine the acceptable ranges of prior probabilities.
This, however, is at best a weak reason for denying rationalism. If we have
to choose between the propositions
1. There are rational and irrational (though coherent) ways of assigning prior
probabilities, but no one has yet been able to systematically describe which
ways are rational and which irrational. 
and:
2. No one is justified in believing that water is made of hydrogen and oxygen,
rather than sodium and uranium.
it is clear which of the two is less plausible. (2) is incredibly implausible. (1) is
inconvenient but not particularly implausible. It is not especially surprising that
we should have proved so far unable to adequately describe the rational
constraints on assignment of prior probabilities. (Consider the range of other
things that philosophers have had trouble adequately describing, from the
meaning of “knowledge,” to the principles of right conduct, to the justification
for perceptual beliefs.) The difficulties critics have raised for objective Bayesians
are serious and important difficulties. But they are not strong evidence for the falsity
of the view, certainly not strong enough to rationally lead us to prefer a theory
that engenders an extreme philosophical skepticism.
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